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History as Reflected in Capital Markets:
The Case of World War II
BRUNO S. FREY AND MARCEL KUCHER
Historical events are reflected in asset prices. We analyze movements in the price of
bonds issued by five European governments and traded on the Swiss bourse between
1928 and 1948, with special attention to the war years. Some war events that are gener-
ally considered crucial are clearly reflected in government bond prices. This holds, in
particular, for the official outbreak of the war and changes in national sovereignty. But
other events to which historians attach great importance are not reflected in bond prices,
most prominently Germany's capitulation in 1945.
This study looks at changes in the value of financial assets as reflectionsof historical events. More specifically, the historical events considered
here bracket World War II, beginning with Hitler's appointment as chancel-
lor on 30 January 1933 and ending with the two Marshall Plan Conferences
in September 1947. We analyze changes in the price of sovereign bonds
denominated in Swiss francs and traded on the Swiss bourse during this
period. While all the belligerents interfered heavily in—or even closed—
their financial exchanges, the Swiss government, for reasons of neutrality,
refrained from doing so (except for the two months following the German
attack against the West in May and June 1940, when the Swiss bourse did
close). Five issuers dominated the Swiss government-bond market: Ger-
many, the main aggressor in World War II; Austria, a country integrated into
the Third Reich well before the outbreak of the war; France, Germany's
traditional enemy in the West; and Belgium and Switzerland, two neutral
countries, the first of which was drawn into the war, while the latter was
spared direct involvement. There was only very limited trading in the bonds
of other governments.
In this study we address two questions that approach the relationship
between historical events and capital markets from opposite angles. First,
to what extent can changes in government-bond prices be related to histori-
cal events? Do all breaks in the price series correspond to what have been
established as crucial events in World War II, or are there breaks which
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cannot (or cannot easily) be related to these events? Second, to what extent
are historical events reflected as changes in the values of government
bonds? Do capital values rise or fall, and how large and significant are the
changes? Are bonds issued by the various governments affected in the
same or in different ways?
We argue that the answers to these questions shed new light on the war.
Specifically, some events that are generally thought to be crucial are clearly
reflected in the prices of the bonds under study. This holds true, in particular,
for the "official" outbreak of the war in September 1939 (which depressed
the prices not only of Austrian, Belgian, and French, but also of German
government bonds), and for losses and gains of national sovereignty. When
Austria lost its independence and became part of Grossdeutschland, for
example, the value of its sovereign bonds fell by 46 percent; when it re-
gained its nationhood at the Potsdam Conference, their value rose by 12
percent. Similarly, when Belgium and France were overrun by German
forces in the Blitzkrieg of May 1940, their government bonds fell by no less
than 35 percent and 31 percent respectively. On the other hand, some events
to which historians attach great attention are not reflected in bond prices at
all: The most prominent example is Germany's capitulation in 1945, which
did not affect German government-bonds prices.
HISTORICAL EVENTS, INTERPRETATION, AND CAPITAL MARKETS
Many historical events are generally undisputed and their dating poses
few problems. In our context, an example would be Hitler's appointment as
chancellor, which took place on 30 January 1933 (and not, say, in 1930 or
1936). Similarly, the Wehrmacht's unconditional surrender took place in
Reims on 7 May 1945, and was repeated in Berlin on 9 May (and not, say,
in March or April). But even these events are not just facts; they are acts of
historical simplification. Thus, in the case of the German capitulation, it
could be argued that there were still some Wehrmacht units fighting after
these dates, so that a more appropriate date for the capitulation would be
later. Interpretation is thus a crucial element in historical research, and in
interpreting the past great care must be taken not to distort it. In particular,
when past decisions are evaluated the knowledge existing at that particular
time must be taken into account. This is particularly important when deci-
sions turn out to be wrong. For instance, it is not easy to understand, ex post
facto, why Hitler ordered the invasion of the Soviet Union, because accord-
ing to what we know in hindsight, defeat was almost inevitable. Scholars
make an effort to overcome these dangers by careful study of official and
private documents, such as diaries, which are likely to be representative of
the situation as perceived at a particular moment in time. But it is also a
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well-known fact that extant documents are already the result of a selection
process (mainly those documents considered "important" being preserved),
and many of them are rewritten afterwards. An example is Hitler's Tischges-
prdche im Fuhrerhauptquartier, the transcriber of which, it is now known,
inadvertently inserted arguments and comments many years after the war.
It is possible that these later insertions do not fully reflect Hitler's original
statements in 1940.1
According to efficient-market theory, capital markets offer three particular
advantages over other data sources.2 First, provided they are correctly re-
corded (which is probable since bourses are public or quasi-public), securi-
ties prices reflect the situation obtaining at the given point in time. The fu-
ture is not known, nor can it be incorporated into these data retroactively.
What can be registered are the decision makers' subjective expectations
about the future, which is a wholly different matter. Our dataset captures the
mood existing among investors at a given point in time, for instance expecta-
tions regarding the likelihood of Germany winning the war and honoring its
foreign debts. Second, investors are likely to evaluate carefully the prevail-
ing situation, as well as any likely future developments, because errors di-
rectly affect their pocketbooks. Even a Nazi sympathizer had to weigh the
probability of default on, or repudiation of, German government bonds
should Germany lose the war. Failure to do so incurred a great risk of capital
loss. This too distinguishes capital markets from other data sources, particu-
larly surveys and questionnaires. A final advantage is that financial markets
usually exhibit a high predictive power, due to so-called marginal traders.
This type of trader carefully assesses the relevant information and acts on a
relatively unbiased basis. In the extreme case, one such trader can drive the
market price to the underlying equilibrium.3
On the other hand, one must also bear in mind the limitations of this
method. Most importantly, traders of government bonds are only interested
in the likely financial consequences of political events. They seek to evaluate
how a given event affects the probability that debt will be serviced and ulti-
mately redeemed. Capital markets, moreover, and especially the govern-
ment-bond market, do not reflect the general state of economic and political
expectations at a particular point in time. Rather, they capture the expecta-
tions of a special group of people, not only floor traders but also the much
larger group of underlying investors. It would be of considerable interest to
know exactly who the ultimate buyers and sellers on the government bond
market were during the period in question. But no records exist as to the
1
 Urner, Schweiz.
2
 See for example Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets."
3
 On the marginal trader and the Hayek hypothesis see Smith, "Markets"; or Forsythe et al.,
"Anatomy."
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identity of these persons; their characteristics can be determined only in
general terms (that will be explored later).
Our analysis of break-points does not identify historical facts, but rather
the acquisition and assessment of information relevant for bondholders.
Investors followed the news not for its own sake, but in order to predict what
would happen to the bonds they owned or considered acquiring. Events were
evaluated with respect to their impact on the probability of government debt
service. Some events of the war years were deemed important and thus
influenced bond prices, while others did not affect the perceived probability
of debt service, and therefore were not reflected in bond prices.
In Switzerland during the war, information was very quickly and reliably
disseminated both in the press and on radio.4 This raises the question of
whether financial markets might have registered historical facts in advance.
In such a case, a break would be visible before the event, or completely
absent, depending on the speed of adjustment. Either way, no break would
be visible at the date of the event itself. There exists suggestive evidence,
however, that financial markets tend to overreact to the arrival of news.5 The
overreaction hypothesis implies that even if many investors have predicted
an event well in advance, and financial markets have adjusted accordingly,
a break in the price series can still be identified.
THE GOVERNMENT BOND MARKET
During World War II, as so often before, belligerent governments directly
or indirectly intervened in markets under their control, including financial
markets. In Germany in particular, many foreign-exchange restrictions were
either introduced or tightened soon after the Nazi takeover in 1933.6 The
only market where bonds of the governments under consideration were
freely traded was the Swiss bourse. For reasons of neutrality, the Swiss
government controlled neither transactions nor prices, and there were no
restrictions on foreign investors. Trading was halted only during May/June
1940, when it was unclear whether German forces would outflank the
Maginot Line to the north (through Belgium and the Netherlands) or to the
south (through Switzerland).
Many governments issued bonds in Switzerland during the interwaryears.
Here we are only considering obligations of national governments. The
foreign governments that borrowed most in the Swiss capital market were
France and Germany, followed by Belgium and Austria. The value at emis-
4
 See for example Salis, Chronik, or Moos, Grosse Weltgeschehen.
5
 See for example De Bondt and Thaler, "Does the Stock Market?"
6
 Many of the German capital controls had been introduced during the banking crises in September
1931 and were only tightened by the Nazi government The Nazis did, however, add some new restric-
tions, such as those on transfers of interest payments.
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sion of Germany's sovereign debt was roughly SFr 3 billion, France's
SFr 3.6 billion, Belgium and Austria's SFr 1 billion and SFr 590 million,
respectively (all 1999 values).7 Our analysis considers a weighted index of
the values of all government bonds issued in Switzerland after 1922 for each
of these four countries. It is important to note that all of the aforementioned
bonds were issued and traded in Swiss francs. Bondholders were therefore
protected against debased repayments. Exchange-rate fluctuations could
theoretically alter the probability of debt service by changing its real cost.
But since exchange rates of most currencies were fixed against the Swiss
franc during World War II (the sole exception being the U.S. dollar), the
latter effect was probably of slight importance.
Due to the large number of Swiss government bonds traded on this mar-
ket, we restrict ourselves to the twelve largest issues. A value index has been
constructed by comparing the average rate of return on these bonds to the
average monthly rate of return on the twelve largest Swiss government
bonds over the period from 1906 to 1925.8
No information is available on who traded at the Swiss stock exchange
during World War II. But as we have mentioned before, even if we knew
their identity, it would remain unclear whose money they were investing.
Given the high degree of openness of the Swiss financial market, it seems
likely that investors from all over Europe used this "safe haven." There is,
however, some limited information available concerning the volume of trad-
ing in government bonds on the Swiss bourse. The Swiss National Bank did
not keep records on turnover in stocks or bonds; but turnover was taxed and
the returns have been used to estimate the extent of trading. According to
Hubert Schwab, trade in foreign government bonds fell from about SFr1999
18 billion in 1937 to about 3.5 billion in 1943, rebounding thereafter to
about 7 billion in 1946.9 German and French government bonds each ac-
counted for roughly 30 percent of the annual turnover, whereas the respec-
tive shares of Belgium and Austria stood at 7 and 6 percent. In 1937 trading
in Swiss government bonds amounted to about half that of all foreign bonds.
During the war, investing in government bonds of the belligerents grew
7
 All amounts indicated in this paragraph are in 1999 Swiss francs. For the conversion of war-era
prices into 1999 equivalents we only took inflation into account. Since the Swiss CPI is nowadays about
6.9 times higher than during World War n, values at emission were multiplied by 6.9 in order to get
1999 Swiss francs. So, for example, the actual value for the 31 German government bonds at time of
emission was only roughly SFr 460 million However, some researchers (such as Jost, Politik und Wirt-
schaft) point out that not only inflation, but also the development over time of national income, should
be taken into account when converting prices. This, of course, would yield considerably higher values
in 1999 Swiss francs.
1
 For December 1939, for example, the average return of the twelve bonds was 4.25 percent Compar-
ing this to the 4.42 percent average return for the period from 1906 to 1925 yields an index of 104.00
((4.42/4.25)* 100).
9
 Schwab, Schweizerische Effektenmarkt.
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increasingly risky, so investors shifted money into Swiss government bonds.
The best estimates available indicate an annual turnover of approximately
S F r ^ 9 billion in 1937,4.5 billion in 1940, and 13 billion in 1946.
World War II "officially" started with the German invasion of Poland in
September 1939, and ended in the West with the unconditional surrender of
the German forces in May 1945. In many respects, however, the war started
earlier, perhaps with the occupation of the Rhineland by Germany in March
1936, or the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. It could even be
argued that the war was a direct consequence of the Nazi takeover in January
1933. To answer the question whether it makes sense to look at this period
as a form of war preceding the official declarations, we include monthly data
extending from December 1933 (December 1928 for Swiss bonds) to De-
cember 1948.10 All data have been collected from monthly reports of the
Swiss National Bank.11
ECONOMETRIC METHODS
Our basic method is to search for structural breaks in these series of
government-bond prices. In contrast to an event study, the starting point is
not a list of dates, with the data then revealing which of them "matter."
Rather, the method used here allows the data to speak for itself, without a
priori specification of the dates.
The basic idea behind the procedure used is to estimate random walks
within small time windows and then to test for differences in mean bond
prices between these windows. This will provide information on threats
common to all the countries considered. While this method might be useful
to answer a variety of questions regarding events that affected all bonds, it
also means that nothing can be said about country-specific threats. There-
fore, in a second step, we test for country-specific threats by estimating
conditional random walks and then testing for differences in the mean bond
prices for each country. The term "conditional" must be stressed here, since
the second procedure corrects for factors influencing all government bonds
10
 Unfortunately, higher-frequency data are not available. While weekly or daily observations are
econometrically unnecessary, monthly data might mislead: Suppose that Event A raised bond prices
early in the month, while Event B lowered them later on. The data will report this as a wash and we will
miss two potentially important events. Or the data might say that something happened in, say, Novem-
ber; but if several things happened in November, then one might find oneself at a loss to say which
particular event it was that moved the prices. However, while we cannot exclude the possibility that we
missed some dates in our study due to the usage of monthly data, we have never encountered two
important events in the month before a break-point. So while daily data might enable us to identify
events with greater precision, we do not think that they would lead us to new insights.
11
 Data for the Swiss series can be found in the Swiss National Bank's Monatsberichte, tables 13
(1928 to 1930), 12(1931 to 1938 and 1942 to 1944), 9 (1939 to 1941 and 1947 to 1949), and 10(1945
to 1946); indices for foreign government bonds are taken from tables 14 (1934 to 1938 and 1941 to
1946), 18 (1939), 17 (1940) and 12 (1947 to 1949).
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in a similar way. We will therefore not find breaks in, say, the German gov-
ernment bond index as a result of changing inflation or real interest rates.
This holds also for mean differences: the second procedure only tests for
significant structural mean breaks in bond prices conditional to the price
movements of all government bonds traded in Switzerland. For example, an
event that led to a 10-percent increase in Swiss government-bond prices and
to a 5-percent increase of the prices of all government bonds will increase
the conditional mean of the Swiss bond prices by 5 percent only. It also
means that an event that has the same effect on the bond prices of all coun-
tries will not be recognized.12
In order to find all possible dates for structural breaks, we apply a four-
step procedure based on the work of Anindya Banerjee, Robin Lumsdaine,
James Stock, and Pierre Perron.13 Similar methods have previously been
applied effectively by Russel Sobel, Kristen Willard, Timothy Guinnane,
and Harvey Rosen in order to identify breaks in exchange-rate series.14 For
a full account of the technical details, see the Appendix.
FROM STRUCTURAL BREAKS TO HISTORICAL FACTS
Common Threats, 1933-1948
As can be seen in Figure 1, there is a strong downturn in the index of all
government bonds traded in Switzerland from late 1933 up to the outbreak
of World War II. During the war, the index remained relatively stable at
around 40 percent of par. One interesting feature is the peak in mid-1944,
just about when Allied forces invaded Normandy.
The prewar fall in bond prices mentioned previously is particularly inter-
esting since all five countries were maintaining their interest payments.15 In
addition, the Swiss government decided on a currency devaluation of ap-
proximately 30 percent, as a consequence of which the bank could be ex-
pected to loosen the monetary policy.16 Since both these factors should have
raised bond prices rather than lowered them, it seems likely that the steady
12
 But it will of course show up in the first (unconditional) estimation procedure.
13
 Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock, "Recursive and Sequential Tests"; and Perron, "Great Crash."
14
 Sobel, "Exchange Rate"; and Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen, "Turning Points."
15
 Most of the countries stopped interest payments after the German invasion. For the countries under
consideration, this was the case for Belgium as well as for the remaining parts of France, which ceased
interest payments in the summer of 1940 and November 1942, respectively. Germany continued interest
payments somewhat longer, until June 1943. It is interesting to note that none of the countries formally
repudiated its outstanding debt, and all of them resumed interest payments after the war (for more
details, see the section titled "Postwar Fate of Bond Prices").
16
 On 26 September 1936 the government repealed the law requiring the Swiss National Bank to back
the franc with gold. Nonetheless the bank was still restricted in its monetary policy by a government
requirement that it maintain an exchange ratio of roughly 20S mg. gold per franc. This decision was
taken above the Bank's objections. See CrettolandHalbeisen, WdhrungspolitischeHintergriinde,?. 14.
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FIGURE 1
INDEX OF ALL GOVERNMENT BONDS TRADED IN SWITZERLAND, 1933-1948
Source: Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1933-1948.
decline had something to do with the ongoing war preparations. But it re-
mains unc\eai,prima facie, which events traders deemed important. In order
to judge among the alternatives, the method just described may be fruitfully
applied. Since in this section we are interested in events that affected all
government bonds, we shall seek to isolate break-points in the index of all
government bonds by estimating an unconditional random walk.
The four-step procedure identifies nine statistically significant breaks in
the time series of all government bonds; these are displayed in Table 1. Each
event has the "expected" sign. With the exception of the Swiss devaluation,
and to some extent the Marshall Plan Conferences, all of them are related
with either causing, prolonging, or shortening the war. The two events indi-
cating an earlier end to the war—the Normandy invasion and, of course, the
German capitulation itself—had a positive impact on bond prices. On the
other hand, all events indicating that there would be war, that the war would
last longer, or that it would involve more countries than previously believed,
had a negative impact on the index. Most prominently, the actual outbreak
of war reduced bond values by more than one-quarter.
Most of the events identified will be described in detail in the following
sections. In this section we will comment only on two events that could not
be identified in any of the country-specific estimations. The first is the deval-
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TABLE 1
STRUCTURAL BREAK-POINTS AND CORRESPONDING HISTORICAL EVENTS:
ALL GOVERNMENT BONDS TRADED IN SWITZERLAND
Date Change in Overall Bond Index*
(yyyy.mm) (percentage) Major Events
1935.03
1936.10
1939.02
1939.09
1941.12
1942.11
1944.06
1945.04
1947.07
-5.6***
+2.3***
-7.7***
-26.4***
-1.7**
-1.9**
+5.4***
+4.3***
-5.2***
General Draft in Germany
Devaluation of the Swiss Franc
German Invasion of Czechoslovakia
German Invasion of Poland
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
Russian Counteroffensive at Stalingrad
Allied Invasion of Normandy
German Capitulations)
Marshall Plan Conferences
* Percentage change in absolute mean.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Sources: See the text.
uation of the Swiss franc on 27 September 1936, which had the expected
positive impact on bond prices. This "event" cannot be identified in any of
the country-specific estimations, probably because it had approximately the
same effect on all bonds, and therefore disappears in the conditional random-
walk analyses.
The second such event is the Marshall Plan Conference of July 1947.
The idea that a conference deciding on a program to rebuild Europe
should have had a negative impact on government bonds seems quite
paradoxical, but it was also seen to mark the beginning of the Cold War.
The first conference of the Three Powers, in Paris from 27 June to 2 July,
was planned to conceptualize the proposals made by U.S. Secretary of
State Marshall in June 1947. It soon turned out that the differences be-
tween the United States and Britain on the one side, and the Soviet Union
on the other, could not be resolved, and the conference ended without the
intended results. This failure had important consequences: the common
European program, which Marshall had in mind when making his propos-
als, had turned into a Western European program with several anti-Soviet
elements.17 The confrontation culminated as first Poland and later all
countries under Soviet occupation withdrew their promises to participate
in the follow-up conference.18 The negative break in the index of all gov-
ernment bond prices suggests that even in 1947 the importance of this
withdrawal, which nowadays is widely regarded as the beginning of the
Cold War, was understood by the capital markets.
" Hardach, Marshall-Plan, pp. 48ff.
11
 Parrish and Narinsky, New Evidence.
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Germany, 1933-1948
Figure 2 shows the monthly price index of the 31 German government
bond issues traded on the Swiss bourse. Visual analysis reveals a secular
decline. The steep drop between 1933 and 1935 indicates that bondholders
feared that the Nazis would seek to renegotiate their foreign debts, or sim-
ply default. This fear was strongly nurtured by official pronouncements
advocating extreme autarchy; heavy-handed interventions in the capital
markets further depressed bond values.19 A moratorium on Versailles repa-
rations payments was declared in mid-1933, at the same time that the gov-
ernment redeemed many foreign bonds in an effort to become as autarchic
as possible.
The partial recovery in 1937 and 1938 may be attributed to the (short-
term) success of the expansionary fiscal policy that accompanied rearma-
ment: national income picked up, and unemployment fell sharply. The ratio
of foreign to total government debt fell from 18.7 to 5.4 percent.20 The Nazis
thereby regained some financial respectability with foreign investors. While
the German government amassed a huge internal debt to finance armaments
and other government expenditures, the probability of foreign-debt service
was considered to have improved.
But Hitler's aggressive foreign policy and increasing isolation led to
another drastic fall in German bond prices from mid-193 8 to the outbreak of
war in 1939. Bond traders feared that the impending war would reduce
Germany's willingness and ability to service its foreign debt. There was
again a rise in the value of German government bonds after the successful
Blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940, but it did not last long: from the second half
of 1941 there was a permanent fall in German bond values, suggesting that
investors expected early on that the Nazis would lose the war, that the debt
would no longer be serviced, and that the capital invested would be lost.
Econometric analysis identifies six break-points for Germany. Table 2
gives a survey of the resulting break-points and the corresponding percent-
age changes in the conditional mean price index. German government bonds
experienced a large and statistically significant surge beginning in the sum-
mer and autumn of 193 6. In July/August of that year, the conditional average
index rose by more than 7 percent relative to the conditional mean (that is,
to the index of all other government bonds traded on the Swiss market). This
might be attributed to the Olympic Games in Berlin, which took place in
August and which made the Nazi regime look peaceable to many observ-
" German economic policy in the prewar and war period is discussed in Boelcke, Kosten; K5llner,
Milit&r und Finanzen; Milward, War, Economy and Society, Federau, Zweite Weltkrieg; Fischer,
Wirtschqftspolitik; and Erbe, Nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik.
20
 Erbe, Nationalsozialistische Wirtschqftspolitik, p. 51.
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FIGURE 2
INDEX OF 31 GERMAN GOVERNMENT BOND ISSUES TRADED IN SWITZERLAND,
1933-1948
Source: Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1933-1948.
ers.21 The market remained bullish through January 1937, at which point the
boom was particularly marked.
In March 1939 Germany invaded those parts of Czechoslovakia not al-
ready ceded at the Munich Conference in September 1938. According to
many historians, this heralded the beginning of World War II.22 The govern-
ment bond markets support this interpretation of history. The value of Ger-
man government bonds fell by no less than 17 percent compared to the aver-
age market values, indicating that traders had lost even more confidence in
the German government's capacity to service its debts. The invasion of
Czechoslovakia was the first time Hitler annexed non-"German" territory,
which was taken as an indication that he would not stop there, and that a
major war was likely. However, some uncertainty remained; some actors on
capital markets obviously thought that this conquest had satisfied Hitler's
demands. Accordingly, the value of German government bonds dropped
only half as much as they would at the "official" outbreak.
21
 For example, the French delegation used the fascist salute upon entering the stadium at the Olym-
pic opening ceremony.
22
 See for example Weinberg, World at Arms.
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TABLE 2
STRUCTURAL BREAK-POINTS AND CORRESPONDING HISTORICAL EVENTS:
GERMANY
Date
(yyyy.mm)
1936.07
1939.03
1939.09
1941.12
1942.11
1945.02
Change in German Bond Index*
(percentages)
+8**
-17**
-39***
-5**
_7**»
-34***
Major Events
Olympic Games in Berlin (30 July-16 August)
Invasion of Czechoslovakia (15-16 March)
Invasion of Poland (1 September)
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December)
Russian Counteroffensive at Stalingrad (November)
Yalta Conference (4 -11 February)
* Percentage change in the conditional mean (that is, the parameter y, from equation A2).
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*•* = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Sources: See the text.
World war became a reality after 1 September 1939, when German troops
invaded Poland. Since the end of 1938 capital markets had been interpreting
Nazi actions in a strongly negative way. The actual start of the war sent the
value of German government bonds plummeting 39 percent. Obviously,
traders were extremely pessimistic about the prospects of a German victory.
As already noted, the Swiss bourse was closed in May/June 1940, so the
immediate effect of the German Blitzkrieg victories are not reflected in our
data. But Figure 2 clearly shows that the average price of German govern-
ment bonds rebounded to prewar levels. It is worth noting, however, that it
did not surpass them. This may be interpreted to indicate that after the Blitz-
krieg peace was considered a likely prospect, with "normal" prewar condi-
tions expected to resume.
The fourth structural break is identified in November/December 1941, but
the decline of average bond prices is rather small (around 5 percent). It
reflects another major war event, namely the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor (7 December) and the consequent war declarations of the United States
(and the United Kingdom) on Japan, and of Germany (and Italy) on the
United States (8 and 11 December, respectively).
Yet another significant drop in German bond values (about 7 percent)
occurred in November 1942. In that month the Soviet army launched a mas-
sive counteroffensive against the German invaders. More than 300,000
German troops were encircled at Stalingrad. Traders on the Swiss bourse
evidently considered the counteroffensive as even more detrimental to Ger-
many's ability to service its debt than was the capitulation by Field Marshal
Friedrich Paulus three months later (2 February 1943).
The last break-point indicated by the German data occurred towards the
end of the war, in February 1945. At the Yalta Conference the Allied great
powers decided that only a complete capitulation of all German forces on all
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INDEX OF 9 AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT BOND ISSUES TRADED IN SWITZERLAND,
1933-1948
Source: Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1933-1948.
fronts would be accepted, and that Germany would be divided into three
military occupation zones. This was interpreted to be a decisive blow to the
Nazis—more so even than the formal capitulation of the German military in
May 1945—and resulted in a fall of German bond prices by 34 percent.
Austria, 1933-1948
Figure 3 tracks the monthly price index of the nine Austrian government
bond issues traded in Switzerland. In contrast to Germany, it shows a
marked increase between 1933 and 1937. There was a huge drop with the
Anschluss of March 1938, and it remained quite depressed thereafter. This
drastic fall may be due not only to political factors, but also to the fact that
with annexation, they became subject to the severe German controls on
capital and foreign exchange. It is worth noting, however, that the Austrian
index remained much below its German counterpart until mid-1944, even
though Germany had formally assumed all Austrian foreign debts.
Econometric analysis of the Austrian government bond index identifies
three statistically significant break-points (see Table 3). The index fell by no
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TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL BREAK POINTS AND CORRESPONDING HISTORICAL EVENTS:
AUSTRIA
Date Change in Austrian Bond Index*
(yyyy.mm) (percentages) Major Events
1938.03 -46*** German Annexation of Austria
1939.09 -46*** German Invasion of Poland
1945.08 +12** Potsdam Conference
* Percentage change in the conditional mean (that is, the parameter ys from equation A2).
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Sources: See the text.
less than 46 percent upon the Anschluss in March 1938. A significant drop
is visible as of the beginning of the year, when the Nazi government pre-
pared that event. It is noteworthy that traders on the Swiss bourse did not
consider the seemingly enthusiastic Austrian support for the Anschluss to be
relevant to their interests. The same holds for its near-unanimous ratification
in a plebiscite undertaken on 10 April of the same year.23
As with German debt, the outbreak of war deeply depressed Austrian
government bond values (by 46 percent in September 1939). Oddly, the
German capitulation of May 1945 is not reflected in these data. One reason
might be that Austria's political future, and thereby the servicing of its debt,
was taken to be uncertain; traders were unable to predict clearly how defeat
would affect that part of the Reich which had, after all, been annexed by the
Germans. This uncertainty was mitigated in July/August of the same year
when the Potsdam Conference settled on Austrian independence, a decision
reflected in a 12-percent increase in average bond prices.
France, 1933-1948
The raw data for French government bonds (Figure 4) show a fairly stable
value up to mid-193 8, followed by huge drops coinciding with the "official"
outbreak of the war, the invasion by German forces, and the French capitula-
tion (22 June 1940). After trading resumed at the Swiss bourse, French
bonds experienced a secular increase in value up to the end of 1945. It is
interesting to note that the value of French government bonds remained
above 20 percent of par, even though France suspended interest payments
in November 1942 and did not resume debt service until after the period
considered. The fact that French government-bond prices did not drop to
zero implies a surprising degree of confidence that France would reemerge
as an independent nation and resume debt service.
23
 Approximately 4,453,000 of the 4,484,000 electors voted "yes," only 11,924 voted "no," and 5,776
spoiled their ballots. See Henschy, Freedom.
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Our econometric procedure identifies five statistically significant break-
points in the French series (Table 4). French government-bond values suf-
fered a blow when the Germans occupied the demilitarized Rhineland in
May 1936. Investors may at this point have lost some confidence in France's
willingness and ability to resist Nazi aggression. The "official" outbreak of
war reduced prices still further, as did the defeat of May/June 1940. The
Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944 was greeted as a sign of military
and political recovery, and raised French government bond values.
TABLE 4
STRUCTURAL BREAK POINTS AND CORRESPONDING HISTORICAL EVENTS: FRANCE
Date
(yyyy.mm)
1936.05
1939.09
1940.05
1944.06
1946.01
Change in French Bond Index*
(percentages)
-4**
- 2 5 * "
f-31]b
+16***
-14***
Major Events
German Occupation of the Rheinland
German Invasion of Poland
German Invasion of the Low Countries and France
Allied Invasion of Normandy
None Identified
* Percentage change in the conditional mean (that is, the parameter y, from equation A2).
b
 Difference in the bond values between the day when trading was stopped and when it was resumed. For
methodological reasons it is not possible to identify such "breaks" by the econometric techniques used.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. *** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Sources: See the text.
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Belgium, 1933-1948
The value of Belgian government bonds traded in Switzerland exhibited
marked variations (Figure 5). A strong increase from 1934 to 1937 was
followed by an even stronger fall, to about 30 percent of par in 1940. Bond
values then recovered over the remainder of the war, right up to 1947.
TABLE 5
STRUCTURAL BREAK POINTS AND CORRESPONDING HISTORICAL EVENTS:
BELGIUM
Date
(yyyy.mm)
1937.09
1939.08
1940.05
1943.02
1944.06
1945.04
Change in Belgian Bond Index*
(percentages)
- 3 * *
-10***
[-35?
+10**
+6**
+7**
Major Events
None Identified
German Invasion of Poland
German Invasion of Low Countries and France
German Capitulation at Stalingrad
Allied Invasion of Normandy
German Capitulations)
• Percentage change in the conditional mean (that is, the parameter y, from equation A2).
b
 Difference in the bond values between the day when trading was stopped and when it was resumed. For
methodological reasons it is not possible to identify such "breaks" by the econometric techniques used.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. •*• = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Sources: See the text
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Our econometric analysis identifies six break-points in this price series
(Table 5). The "official" start of the war, and to a much greater extent the
German invasion of May 1940, sent prices plummeting. Allied victories at
Stalingrad (February 1943), on the beaches of Normandy (June 1944), and
at the very end of the war (April 1945) predictably pushed up the values of
Belgian government bonds.
Switzerland, 1928-1948
The overall value of Swiss government bonds shows a long-term rise of
about 30 percent over the twenty years from 1928 to 1948 (Figure 6). Values
tended to fall in the 1930s. The strong increase in value in 1936 can be at-
tributed to a devaluation of the Swiss currency in September. However, this
economic event does not correspond to a statistically significant break in the
data, most likely because it also affected the values of all other bonds traded
in Switzerland. Prices experienced a marked drop in the three years before
the "official" outbreak of the war, until the Blitzkrieg of May 1940. After
trading was resumed later that year, Swiss government bonds increased in
value until they regained the prewar level of 1936/37.
160
 n
140 .
120.
100 .
t
- 80 .I
g.
6 0 .
40 .
20-
12/28 12/30 12/32 12/34 12/36 12/38 12/40 12/42 12/44 12/46 12/48
FIGURE 6
INDEX OF 12 MAJOR SWISS GOVERNMENT BOND ISSUES, 1928-1948
Source: Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1928-1948.
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700025183
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:49:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
World War II 485
TABLE 6
STRUCTURAL BREAK POINTS AND CORRESPONDING HISTORICAL EVENTS:
SWITZERLAND
Date
(yyyy.mm)
1933.04
1935.03
1936.09
1939.10
1940.06
1941.06
Change in Swiss Bond Index*
(percentages)
_4***
-6***
+7***
+3**
+4***
+4***
Major Events
Establishment of the Nazi Dictatorship (24 March)
General Draft in Germany
Olympic Games in Berlin
German Invasion of Poland
German Invasion of the Low Countries and France
German Invasion of the Soviet Union
' Percentage change in the conditional mean (that is, the parameter y, from equation A2).
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
Sources: See the text.
Econometric analysis reveals six statistically significant break-points,
summarized in Table 6. The consolidation of Hitler's dictatorship in the
spring of 1933, as well as the reintroduction of the general draft in March
1935, were considered to be negative events from the point of view of inves-
tors in Swiss government bonds. The Olympic Games in August 1936 gave
the Nazi government a convenient propaganda forum; Swiss bond values
jumped in September 1936, which may be interpreted as a sign that Hitler's
government was thereby able to gain some goodwill with investors (as well
as with many British, French, and Italian politicians). In view of Switzer-
land's neutrality, the "official" outbreak of war in September 1939 increased
Swiss government bond values the following month. It is likely that funds
were shifted into Swiss government bonds, which seemed to be safer than
those of the four other countries considered here (all of whose values fell).
A similar pattern appeared in June 1940, after the German invasion of the
Benelux countries and France, and again after the invasion of the Soviet
Union in June 1941. In both cases, the attacks were directed at countries
other than Switzerland, so that this country's position as a safe haven im-
proved. In particular, Hitler's decision to outflank the Maginot line in the
north, instead of south through Switzerland, was a lucky event.
HISTORICAL FACTS AND GOVERNMENT BOND VALUES
This section analyzes first, whether historical "facts" related to World War
II, and generally considered to be important by historians, show up as statis-
tically significant break-points in the government bonds of the five countries
considered, and if so when; second, xnwhat direction, and by how much, the
bond values changed. And third, as pointed out in the introduction, it is also
important to consider what historical "facts" are not reflected as break-points
in government bond values.
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The literature we have consulted takes the following seven events to
have been turning points in World War II: the German invasion of Poland
on 1 September 1939, marking the "official" outbreak of war; the German
invasion of Benelux and France in May 1940; the German invasion of the
Soviet Union in June 1941; the war entry of the United States following the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941; the German defeat at
Stalingrad in February 1943; the Allied invasion of Normandy in June
1944; and the German capitulation of May 1945, marking the "official"
end of the war.24
One interesting question we are in a position to answer is whether the
dates marking the "official" beginning and end of World War II correspond
to the evaluations of investors. As virtually all historians agree that the war
was initiated by the Nazis, we include the following seven important histori-
cal events occurring in Germany in the period before the "official" outbreak:
Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January 1933, and the Enabling Act of
March 1933 which gave Hitler essentially unlimited power; the Ro'hm
Putsch of June/July 1934, whereby Hitler vitiated the SA and reestablished
the Wehrmacht as the sole military force; the reintroduction of the general
military draft in March 1935; the invasion of the demilitarized Rhineland in
March 1936; the Olympic Games in Berlin in July and August 1936; Xh&An-
schluss of Austria in March 1938; and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in
March 1939, whereby Hitler broke his formal promise, given at Munich, that
the Sudetenland was his last territorial ambition.
In the same vein, the following two historical events are included in order
to test whether the "official" end of the war also marked the end according
to capital-market data: the Yalta Conference, where the principle of Ger-
many's unconditional surrender, and its division into three sectors of occu-
pation, was decided. This conference took place in February 1945, that is,
before capitulation, but it referred to postwar arrangements; and the Potsdam
Conference of August 1945, where (among other issues) Austria's rebirth as
a nation was decided.
Table 7 lists the 16 historical events just mentioned and indicates the
statistically significant changes in the government-bond values of the Axis
powers (Germany and Austria), the neutral countries (Switzerland and Bel-
gium), and one Allied nation (France). The table speaks for itself and it
suffices therefore to concentrate on the most important aspects. Only one
event, the "official" outbreak of the war, produced a statistically significant
break-point in all five countries in our sample. It greatly reduced the value
of the government bonds of all belligerents: investors thus did not "pick a
winner" but considered the war to be a general threat to their assets. Neutral
24
 In view of the capital-market data available, we restrict our attention to the European theater of
World War n. A comprehensive overview can be found in Weinberg, World at Arms.
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Belgium was also negatively affected, probably because investors thought
that it would likely be drawn into a military conflict between Germany and
France, a prediction that proved correct. The falling price of bonds issued by
belligerent governments stands in contrast to a modest increase in value of
Swiss government bonds, because that country was considered a (relatively)
safe haven. Econometric analysis thus leads to the same evaluation as does
traditional historical research. It is worth noting, however, that major events
before that date are also clearly reflected on the bond market, most impor-
tantly the German invasions of the Rhineland and of Czechoslovakia.
Another set of historical "facts" clearly reflected in the bond market are
major changes in national sovereignty. When a government disappeared
(Austria in 1938, Czechoslovakia in 1939, and Germany in 1945) or was
occupied (Belgium and France in 1940), the price of its debt experienced a
very marked drop. Conversely, when a government reemerged (Austria in
1945), its bond values rose sharply.
Several wartime events considered important by historians are reflected
as significant break-points in bond values. In addition to the major German
invasions (Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Benelux, France, and the
Soviet Union), this also holds true for two engagements generally considered
decisive in Germany's ultimate defeat: Stalingrad and Normandy. On the
other hand, viewed from the bond market, the end of World War II is de-
fined less by the German surrender (which affected Belgian bond values
only) than by the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, where the fate of the
defeated countries was decided.
THE POSTWAR FATE OF BOND PRICES
The reader may wonder what happened to bond prices after the war. Was
the market correct in its assessment—suggested by the very low value of
bond prices at the end of the war—that most European countries would not
service their debts for a considerable time to come?
Table 8 depicts the value of bonds issued by four of the five European
governments under study. (Switzerland is excluded because it never stopped
interest payments, and values for the Swiss government bonds remained above
par almost throughout the war.) The most obvious feature is that the four
countries' bond prices developed very differently. While Belgium resumed
interest payments almost immediately after the war (such that its bonds
reached par as early as 1946), Germany, for example, did not resume general
debt service until 1954. Common to all countries under consideration is the
fact that their postwar governments acknowledged all sovereign debt and did
eventually resume service. None of the countries, however, offered investors
compensation for the interest payments foregone during the war.
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TABLE 8
VALUES OF FOREIGN-GOVERNMENT BONDS TRADED IN SWITZERLAND AFTER
WORLD WAR n
(percentage of par)
Date
(yyyy-mm)
1945.12
1947.12
1949.12
1951.12
1953.12
1955.12
Germany
21.18
16.72
39.50
48.15
89.89
99.84
Austria
39.99
30.40
49.03
64.09
102.95
108.54
France
59.67
40.41
44.65
73.72
78.70
83.89
Belgium
90.45
97.97
101.52
99.37
104.77
103.85
Sourct Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1948-1956.
There is a large literature on when and why governments repudiate
debts.25 There are several models of the conditions under which regimes
decide to repudiate debts incurred by either earlier regimes or in the service
of aims for which they do not think their people should pay (such as fight-
ing against the Nazis). In the light of these models, it seems quite clear that
those countries which relied most heavily on new foreign credits tried to
resume payments as soon as possible. In our sample, this was the case
especially for Belgium and (to a lesser degree) Austria. As a consequence,
Belgian government bonds had already reached par in 1946, Austrian
bonds in 1952.
As is well known, Germany lost a great deal of its productive capacity
during the war (and, in the Soviet zone, thereafter as well). While a currency
reform was undertaken in the Western zone in 1948 to cope with the ensuing
hyperinflation, rationing could not be totally lifted until 1950. Until the
currency reform in 1948, it was unclear whether the new German govern-
ment would pay its predecessor's foreign debt. As a consequence, the price
of its bonds fell to as low as 15 percent of par. It was only in August 1953
that West Germany began to service English and Swiss foreign debts; full
service on all foreign debts was resumed in the third quarter of 1954.26
In France, government debt had tripled between 1939 and 1945 while
industrial production fell by 80 percent. In order to cope with the resulting
high inflation, the post-Vichy government conducted a currency reform in
1946, accompanied by the introduction of heavy taxes on capital. The result
was a deep recession in 1947/48, which the government tried to combat with
heavy interventions financed through new credits from the United States and
from the European Recovery Program (ERP). The French government only
resumed servicing its foreign debt at the end of 1949. As can be seen from
a
 For a good survey on how debts were repudiated in the 1930s, see Eichengreen and Portes, "Debt."
u
 See for example Die Wirtschafislage, 1953-1954.
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Table 8, bond traders nevertheless remained quite pessimistic about France's
long-term capacity to service its foreign debt right up to the end of 1955.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The approach suggested here focuses on the capital market and seeks to
identify statistically significant break-points reflecting historical events.
This allows a quantitative assessment of beliefs at a particular point of
time, uncontaminated by later events that might otherwise influence the
evaluation. This approach has been applied to an important recent period
in European history, from Hitler's rise to the Marshall Plan. It has been
made possible by the fact that the Swiss market for the bonds of various
governments involved in the war essentially functioned without regulatory
interventions during the whole period. Analyzing break-points in the val-
ues of government bonds obviously focuses on a very specific area, and
can therefore only capture one aspect of the wartime experience. The anal-
ysis suffers also from a lack of information on the buyers and sellers of the
government bonds traded in Switzerland during the war. But it does not
follow that capital-market data provide a systematically distorted picture.
Persons and institutions active on capital markets have a direct pecuniary
incentive to evaluate the prospects of the bonds of the various governments
as "objectively" as possible. They cannot afford—at least not in the long
run—to follow their own political preferences with respect to the countries
involved in the war, because such action would result in systematic losses.
We have analyzed the value of government bonds of five countries more
or less affected by the war over the period 1933 to 1948. We find that the
statistically significant break-points identified by the econometric tech-
nique described in the Appendix reflect historical events also considered
important by historical research based on more conventional techniques.
We find, in particular, that the German invasion of Poland prompted a
major downward shift in the bond values of all four countries directly
involved in the war, while Switzerland benefited modestly. Investors con-
sidered it more likely that the Swiss government would be better able to
service its debt than would Germany, Austria, France, or Belgium.
Significant changes in the value of government bonds also occurred
when nations were invaded, as happened to Austria in March 1938, Czecho-
slovakia in March 1939, Belgium and France in May 1940, the Soviet Union
in June 1941, and France again in 1944. The final capitulation of the Wehr-
macht in May 1945 did not affect government bond values (except for Bel-
gium's), which suggests that the German defeat was predicted much earlier
by the traders, and was therefore already reflected in bond prices. More
relevant was the decision of the Allied powers at Yalta to accept only a total
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capitulation on all fronts. The Potsdam decision to restore Austria's state-
hood was predictably associated with a significant rise in the price of that
government's bonds.
Analyzing breaks in capital-market data are of most use when considered
along with events identified and interpreted by more conventional historical
research. This article has followed two different tacks: from the break-points
determined by the econometric methods to historical events, and from the
major historical events to break-points. In both cases the correspondence is
incomplete—some break-points and their signs remain difficult to link with
historical "facts." There are several reasons why such deviations may have
occurred: we may be ignorant of important "facts" of which professional
historians are well aware; historians are themselves unaware of the "facts,"
or have chosen to ignore them; or no such "facts" exist, at least not in the
grand arena of high politics: specifically, break-points may have been driven
by purely financial news.
Conversely, there are a number of reasons why historical "facts" may
not show up as break-points: First, bond-market data may be of poor
quality, for instance if there are too few transactions. Second, govern-
ments may have intervened in the bond market as buyers or sellers, or by
imposing controls of one sort or another. An important case in point
occurs when governments want to prevent the reflection of a political (or
economic) event on the financial market. What might particularly affect
our analysis are changes in capital-market restrictions. Third, the econo-
metric technique applied may be unable to identify break-points relating
to historical events, even though they are in the data. Fourth, a "fact" may
be important from the historian's point of view (it relates to the fate of a
nation, country, or population), but does not affect government debt
service. And fifth, the "fact" may not exist, or is not as important as his-
torians believe. Here the quality of historical research is in question.
However, it would be misleading to assume that all historians identify the
same "facts" as important. So the issue is which historical school or
which individual historians have identified which historical "fact," as
well as the importance attributed to it.27
One of the next steps in research should be to identify which of these
reasons are relevant, and under which circumstances. The purpose of this
article has been to suggest that such an interaction, between quantitative
and qualitative historical research, and between capital market data and
data derived from other sources, is capable of providing new insight into
historical processes.
27
 See for example Kozicki, Developments.
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Appendix: Econometric Estimation Procedure
Our approach is designed to find structural breaks in the series of bond prices. In what
follows, we will only discuss technical details of the second method applied, that is, the
conditional tests. For the unconditional estimation, we adapted the procedure by simply not
correcting for the overall index. All other steps involved remain the same.
To address this task, we follow a sequential test procedure based on Banerjee,
Lumsdaine, Stock, Sobel, Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen in their analyses of the Greenback
market.28 In order to find all possible structural breaks, a four-step procedure is applied.
Using data from a 36-month window starting in December 1933 (December 1928 for
Switzerland), we first estimate the regression
\np, =/30+fi In/?,., + A lnp,_, +s, (Al)
where/?, stands for the index-value of all government bonds of the country considered on
date t, p, is the index of all government bonds traded in Zurich (which we use as a measure-
ment of the market performance as a whole), the ps are the parameters to be estimated, and
e is a white-noise error term. A Wald test associated with the hypothesis that there is a
structural break in the middle of the window is then calculated. The idea behind step one
is to estimate a random walk and then check for changes in the constant, which is the
procedure followed in recent stock-market studies. It implies that bond prices follow an
exponential Brownian motion.29 (We also ran regression with autoregressive processes of
up to the sixth order, but did not find different results.) The inclusion of a measure of
market performance as a right-hand variable allows us to estimate the random walk ceteris
paribus: for example, we allow for factors that might influence the value of all bonds traded
(such as fluctuating real interest rates and inflation).
In a second step, we estimate the regression again, this time using a 36-month window
beginning one month later. This step is repeated until the entire period has been covered.
An example is given in Appendix Figure 1, which depicts the /"-statistics from all the Wald
tests for Germany. By searching for peaks in the series of/"-statistics, the first two steps
identify seven dates for Germany, five for Austria, seven for Switzerland, six for Belgium
and five for France, where the null hypothesis of no structural breaks is most strongly
questioned. The third step consists of choosing the windows around these dates. As an
example, a time window around February 1945 is marked in Appendix Figure 1.
In the fourth step, we test for statistically significant structural breaks within each of the
windows isolated in step three. We do this by estimating a series of the following equations,
which in comparison with equation Al have been extended by a dummy variable:30
lnpl=/30+j3]lnpl_l+j32\npl_l+rsDsl+£, with s = 6 42 (A2)
where Da equals one if date / is on or after date s, and zero otherwise. The parameter y,
measures a change in the conditional mean (that is, a shift in the mean price index ceteris
paribus) that occurs on date s. Since all the prices are in logs, y, can be interpreted as the
percentage change in the conditional mean. We estimate equation A2 repeatedly, each time
moving s by one month. For each resulting equation, we test whether y, is different from
zero using a conventional /"-test. The date associated with the highest /"-statistic is then
u
 Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock, "Recursive and Sequential Tests"; Sobel, "Exchange Rate"; and
Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen, "Turning Points."
29
 A n overview can be found in Duffie, Dynamic Asset Pricing.
30
 A s suggested by Perron, "Great Crash."
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
F-TESTS FOR STRUCTURAL BREAKS IN THE INDEX OF GOVERNMENT BOND
PRICES: GERMANY, 1933-1948
Source: See the text.
designated as the date where the most important mean shift took place within each window.
Since sequential break tests cannot identify breaks around the beginning or end of a sample,
we add six observations at the beginning and at the end of the windows examined. So, for
the first equation estimated in step four, s is set at date six of the new window (which equals
date one in the original window). As an example, the results of step four for the window
isolated in Appendix Figure 1 are shown in Appendix Figure 2.
Three further points warrant comment: first, applying only the last step of this procedure
to the data would yield inappropriate results, since the last step was developed under the
assumption that there is only one break-point in the series. If there is a second shift which
reverses the first, the algorithm described in step four might very well miss both of them.
To address the problem, we look for mean shifts in short "windows" only. Hence we need
steps one to three to determine which periods we should look at.
Second, since the bond price series contain a unit root, test statistics based on regression
residuals will have a nonstandard distribution. For step four, we therefore generate Monte
Carlo critical values for the Wald test under the null hypothesis of no structural breaks.
Critical values for the /"-tests of no breaks are approximated with 5,000 Monte Carlo
simulations of the equation
\np, = c+ (A3)
with c = 0.1 and se(e,) = 0.1. The resulting 90-, 95-, and 99-percent critical values are 3.14,
4.32, and 8.00, respectively.
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700025183
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:49:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
494 Frey andKucher
35
30.
25.
15.
10.
5 .
1/43 7/43 1/44 7/44 1/45 7/45 1/46 7/46
APPENDIX FIGURE 2
F-TEST FOR GERMAN BONDS, TIME WINDOW JANUARY 1943 TO DECEMBER 1946
Source: See the text.
Finally, we also test for variations of the bond index of a specific country relative to the
index of all government bonds traded in Zurich. That is, we rewrite equation Al as
In/?, -In/?, =&+/% ln/?,_, +/32 ln/?,_, +s, (A4)
Such a specification would seem to be more in line with the excess-return literature fre-
quently used in finance studies.31 However, we find the same breakpoints as with the first
procedure suggested, and the size of the effect does not change dramatically (none are
reversed). Since we believe that the coefficients of the specification presented in equation
Al are more easily accessible, only the first specification is used.
The capital market is simultaneously influenced by a great number of factors. The econo-
metric method suggested here allows us only to control some of them. Nevertheless, the
results of our analysis are encouraging.
31
 See for example Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, Econometrics.
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